ConservativeHome's Platform

Rep. Mike Turner: National Security cuts a cause for concern in final debt deal

Congressman Mike Turner is the US Representative for Ohio's 3rd congressional district.

For months, Congress has been debating how to deal with the economic questions surrounding an increase in our debt limit. At a time when foreign nations own nearly $4.5 trillion of our $14.2 trillion debt – proposed cuts in the recently passed deal could have serious implications for our national security.  That’s why I was concerned that national security funding would be subject to an initial $175 billion cut in the final version of the Budget Control Act of 2011 that has been passed by Congress and signed by the President.

Throughout this debate I have advocated for our government to cut current spending and cap it at a responsible level so that we may balance our budget. We must remember though that in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the founding fathers empowered Congress to: "Provide for the common Defense… To raise and support Armies … (and) To provide and maintain a Navy." Fulfilling that obligation and meeting our budgetary responsibilities are not mutually exclusive. As a nation we should be able to provide for our defense and balance our budget. One should not come at the expense of the other.

This is a critical moment for both our nation and our armed forces. We have servicemembers deployed overseas in support of a number of military and humanitarian operations including Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Those operations over the past 10 years have taken a toll on our forces. Currently, the Army needs $25 billion to reset its force right now, while the Marines need $12 billion. Our men and women in uniform are not only being asked to make further sacrifices with additional deployments, but in some cases they’re relying on equipment which is often older than they are. For example, Navy ships and light attack vehicles, on average, were built 20 years ago. In addition the Air Force is relying on bombers averaging 34 years in age and is refueling aircraft with tankers that are nearly 50 years old. 

An additional point of concern is that further cuts to defense are being used as a bargaining chip in a yet to be named Congressional “super-committee.” Twelve members of Congress from the House and Senate, both Democrats and Republicans, are required to find an additional $1.8 trillion in cuts. If the committee deadlocks on an agreement, or fails to complete its work by November 23^rd of this year – then $281 billion in additional defense cuts automatically take effect. These cuts are unspecified and are an arbitrary number chosen to pressure the “super-committee” members into crafting an inadequate deal in fear of these cuts being enacted. I voted against this bill because I could not support a process which circumvents the normal legislative process and gambles with our national security.

Our military remains strong and morale among servicemembers remains high, but we cannot continue to operate with a strained force or we will not be able to meet the obligations of the future. In fact, the Vice-Chiefs of Staff of each of our braches of the military echoed this same sentiment at a hearing before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. General Philip Breedlove, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that some components of the Air Force “are right at the ragged edge.”  Furthermore, additional proposed cuts of $281 billon in the bill would result in a "fundamental restructure of what it is our nation expects from our Air Force."

Our national defense has always been a bipartisan issue in the halls of Congress. Members from both sides of the aisle recognize the role our military plays in both protecting this nation, and advancing the goals of our foreign policy. Subjecting this integral piece of our government to cuts, without thorough debate in committee and on the House floor, sets a dangerous precedent.

Herb London on Libya: We are at sea as one nation in an international armada that has lost its way

Herbert London is president of the Hudson Institute and author of the book Decline and Revival in Higher Education (Transaction Publishers).

Yemen’s security forces killed more than three dozen protestors in the last few days. Qaddafi has announced that Allied efforts to destroy his anti-missile defenses are a form of terrorism and as a consequence, he is prepared to decimate the rebels in Libya.  It seems to me that it is time to ask a question that haunts the history of our time:  Are there no limits to dictatorial power?

Since the Holocaust, the international community has given lip-service to the idea that mass murder by dictatorial leaders should never be tolerated. Yet remarkably there are instances in Africa and Asia where this is common practice. In the Arab world where Sharia prevails, the killing of apostates is a routine practice.

Based on recent events, it would appear that conditions across the globe are sliding back to a barbaric period in which murder of one’s own people for the retention of power is permitted or at least ignored. The argument is we cannot possibly intervene whenever atrocities occur. Or perhaps more logically, sovereignty trumps atrocity.

It is instructive that U.S. State Department officials employed the latter position for a time by suggesting we should not insinuate ourselves into a Libyan civil war.  In other words, however sanguinary the attacks may have been and continue to be, there is not a justifiable role for the US. Needless to say, that position has been modified by our stance on the “no fly zone.”

As I see it the basic Obama foreign policy thrust is based on an incremental U.S. withdrawal from regional influence.  The withdrawal, I should hastily note, is both emotional – an unwillingness to defend our interests and our allies – and physical – a drawdown of troops based on the belief we cannot afford these foreign ventures.

That strategic version, or lack thereof, has created a situation in which our enemies believe we are ineffectual and our allies believe we are untrustworthy.  Instead of hastening to carve out a defensive stance for the U.S. one that recognizes our foreign interests, the administration has decided to channel our foreign policy through the United Nations.  In doing so, the leverage that emerged in the past from the assertion of national power is lost.  We are at sea as one nation in an international armada that has lost its way.

The new concept of America opting out of unilateral action has implications for nations with imperial goals.  Iran has become the “strong horse” in the Middle East neighborhood by default. Our emerging position encouraged its evolution. Ortega y Gasset once noted, “To create a concept is to leave reality behind.” Our concept of multilateralism is a chimera surrounded by a fantasy.

Winston Churchill warned that when democracies triumphed in World War II they “were able to resume the follies which has so nearly cost them their life.” It seems we are at it yet again.

We watch with horror as power hungry barbarians kill their own people.  But we generally tolerate these actions. We are overcome by the magnitude of evil and the inversion of certitudes, but are helpless in their wake. We seek fresh creeds, but do not know how to deal with the revulsion in our collective gut.  And all the while our leaders tell us this will pass and, after all, there is nothing we can do.

Is the world turning to savagery? Is the 1930’s a scenario for the new century? Are we to allow shamefacedly the death and horror we have the capability to prevent? The derision of death lurks in our imagination, but the will to reverse it has not emerged. America cannot police the world, but the U.S. is still the only anchor that can assure international stability. It seems to me that role must be recognized and given the attention history has placed on it.

The U.S. needs to do more, not less, when it comes to defense, and our budget needs to meet the challenge

Thomas G. Mahnken is a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Between 2006 and 2009, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy planning. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategy and planning.

The United States needs to get its fiscal house in order.  The long-term health of the American economy, and the long-term wellbeing of Americans, demands it.  What is less clear is the extent to which cuts in defense spending should be part of any package to do so.  Too often, the question has been posed in economic terms: how much we can “afford” to spend on defense?  The question should more properly be formulated in terms of U.S. national security: how much should the United States spend in order to protect the United States and its citizens from the challenges of today and tomorrow?

The answer to this question came in late July, when the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel delivered its report to Congress.  The 20-member panel, chaired by former Clinton administration Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Bush administration National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, included former senior officials from Democratic and Republican administrations as well as retired senior officers. I served on its staff.  The group argued forcefully that if the United States is to continue play the international role it has for more than half a century, then we may need to do more, not less, when it comes to national defense. 

The panel found "a significant and growing gap between the ‘force structure' of the military -- its size and its inventory of equipment -- and the missions it will be called on to perform in the future." The panel's members were particularly concerned that the force structure outlined in the Obama Administration’s  2010 Quadrennial Defense Review "may not be sufficient to assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face of China's increased military capabilities." The report calls for an increase in U.S. force structure in the Pacific to counter Chinese military modernization, noting, "A robust US force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but including other necessary capabilities, will be essential."

It is powerful statement that a group of 20 senior officials who have served Democratic and Republican presidents agreed that "the [U.S.] force structure needs to be increased in a number of areas, including the need to counter anti-access challenges; strengthen homeland defense, including cyber threats; and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions. It must also be modernized." They called for an increase in the size of the U.S. Navy, the acquisition of a next-generation bomber, and new long-range strike systems. They also acknowledge that although the Defense Department must do everything it can to achieve cost savings on acquisition and overhead, "substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force. Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not re-capitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater."

The panel did point to areas of potential cost savings, however. For example, it tackled the sensitive issue of the Defense Department's rising personnel costs, noting that "a failure to address the increasing costs of the all-volunteer force will likely result in a reduction in the force structure, a reduction in benefits or a compromised all-volunteer force."  It also laid out ways to streamline and cut the cost of acquiring new weapon systems.  Both should be pursued vigorously.

Americans should welcome an honest debate over defense spending.  But to be honest, such a debate should revolve around the role the United States should play in the world and the value of maintaining it. 

Michael Magan and Dorothy Stuehmke: Wikileaks reveal North Korea is alone

Michael Magan, with Media Intelligence Partners in London, was former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director on the National Security Council, and principal negotiator for the resumption of food assistance to North Korea.

Dorothy Stuehmke was the U.S. Government's Senior Advisor to the U.S.-DPRK food aid program (2008-2009), and served on the Korea Desk at the U.S. Department of State (2006-2008).

The release of classified U.S. material by Wikileaks has been characterized in a negative light – as an embarrassment to the U.S. administration and a threat to U.S. national security and the international community at large. As former U.S. government officials who worked on North Korea (DPRK) for the National Security Council and for the Office of Korean Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, it is crucial to underscore the impact these leaks have had on efforts to work with other countries to address common problems.  That being said, the latest revelations regarding China’s position towards the DPRK are revealing.

While Wikileaks may have jeopardized a new wave of thought in China with regard to how it views China-DPRK relations, as well as its evolving perception of the DPRK, the leaks may have also opened North Korea's eyes to a harsh reality: that unbeknownst to the DPRK, it no longer has the backing from China it historically has always had, and that during a pivotal time in DPRK history – one of internal political transition – it just may really be the most isolated country in the world.

Throughout history, China has long been viewed as a staunch supporter of the DPRK regime. The two countries share a border, and China along with Russia supported the DPRK against a U.S.-backed South Korea during the Korean War. Since the end of the Cold War, China has remained a steadfast ally of the DPRK, acting as a main source of foreign aid and trade as the DPRK became increasingly estranged from the rest of the world. Publicly, and to each other, China and the DPRK have maintained a special relationship, and China has always been noted as the country with the most political clout over the DPRK.

But in a major departure from this historical stance, China has recently been described in secret U.S. cables as having had a shift in policy and perception toward the DPRK. The cables reveal a growing frustration in Beijing over the DPRK's string of provocative and aggressive acts, ranging from nuclear and missile tests, the sinking of the Cheonan and death of 46 South Korean sailors, to the most recent attack with loss of life on South Korea's Yeonpyeong island.

According to these secret cables, a new, younger generation among Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regard North Korea as a useful or reliable ally.  In fact, Senior Chinese officials even referred to the DPRK as a “spoiled child.”

This week, China's response has been to exercise damage control; a senior Chinese official was sent to Seoul as part of what China called “emergency consultations,” and Choe Tae Bok, chairman of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, began a five-day visit to China on Tuesday, at the invitation of Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China. The repercussions of this is that China will likely not feel too comfortable about sharing much of what it really thinks with other countries, out of concern that what is said is no longer “off the record.”

Beyond this, how do we use what is now public information to solve the DPRK puzzle?

The leaks could lead to more introversion from the DPRK. During our travels to the DPRK in 2007-2008 to negotiate the restart of the U.S.-DPRK food aid program, it was evident that some in the regime showed signs of more openness to change than others; there were also those who were adamant hard-liners.  With secret U.S. cables such as one that asserts Kim Jong-il's power has weakened after his stroke and predictions he will live no longer than five years, the regime now knows that the outside world has a wealth of information on the hermit kingdom.  Certainly, DPRK hardliners will use this to tighten their grip on power and keep the North closed to the outside world.

However, now that we know some in China support an “independent and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula in the long term” under the leadership of South Korea, this revealing information should be a shocking revelation to Kim Jong Il’s regime – that it does not even have what it assumed was always a constant – China's backing.

Sans China, Kim Jong Il and his son face a whole new paradigm.

Instead of standing by and watching China distance itself from the DPRK, the U.S. and other Western leaders should pressure China to leverage its influence over the DPRK to open its markets as China did five years ago.  China should be reminded that it is also in its' best economic and political interest to maintain stability in the region. There is a stark contrast between China, North Korea and South Korea and China needs to set conditions for the DPRK to halt its nuclear proliferation and hostile actions on the South and begin a transition to a market economy.

While relations with China may be experiencing Wikileak aftershocks, encouraging China to be more proactive in its influence over the DPRK remains in the interest of the U.S. and its allies. The leaks offered a level of transparency that should never happen again. They will create a huge obstacle for U.S. diplomats as they try to engage their counterparts and elicit open and unscripted dialogues and responses over pressing diplomatic issues.

However, as the U.S. prepares its legal response to the unauthorized leaks, (and the full force of the law should be exercised) the world has the opportunity to glance though a candid lens and observe how the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China and even the DPRK may view present day Northeast Asian relations. How the DPRK will behave, with the realization that China would not risk renewed armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, remains to be seen. But what the U.S. and its allies in the Northeast Asia region – namely, South Korea and Japan – should focus on in the immediate future is to show a unified resolve and pursue democratic change, monitored humanitarian assistance to the suffering people, and dialogue conditioned on a halt to the nuclearization of the peninsula.

Meanwhile, for the majority of North Koreans living outside Pyongyang, daily life remains a constant struggle. For a North Korean, a walk in Sinuiju in the dead of winter along the Yalu river that separates the DPRK from China, is a constant reminder of just how far the North has to go. Across the Yalu in China, North Koreans can see Dandong's buildings that soar high into the sky and bathe the city in a flood of glowing light, while North Koreans live enveloped in a cold darkness, with sporadic electricity and heat.  The time has come for change.

Kori Shake: Looking for reasonable cuts in the defense budget makes sense given the times we're in

Kori Schake is a Fellow at the Hoover Institution and an Associate Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy.

Both advocates of cutting defense spending and those who seek to preserve or increase current levels are making exaggerated claims.  The current defense program could be significantly pared back without real danger to our ability to fight and win the nation’s wars.  In particular, military personnel costs – health care and retirement – should be carefully reviewed.  Such cuts are the most difficult kind for the Executive to recommend and for the Congress to enact, but they are the kinds most needed to keep our military strong.  Spending is not a proxy for supporting our military, and we conservatives should not make it so.  We should instead bring the same tough-minded cheapness and accountability to defense that we bring to other endeavors of government.

I agree with Tom Donnelly, Gary Schmidt and others who argue that our current defense spending of around 4% of GDP for the baseline budget is economically sustainable; in fact, it is significantly lower as a proportion of GDP than Cold War spending levels.  Current levels of spending are also supportable on the basis of the activity in which our military is, and likely will remain, engaged.  That is, our spending for defense aligns with our strategy for shaping the international order and the military forces the Pentagon judges necessary. 

The current program, however, is not the only way to manage the threats and opportunities; nor is it a particularly cost-effective way to address them.  Cost has been no object for our defense since 9/11, and we are well-positioned to accept some near-term risk in order to solve the much bigger national security vulnerability of our federal debt.

It would be a terrible mistake for budget hawks to advocate cuts to defense spending on the basis of “shared sacrifice.”  This is an affront to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and their families who have been at war for the past nine years with almost no shared sacrifice from our broader society.  To suggest they now need to do their part is morally repugnant. 

But that does not mean defense spending should not be cut.  Our military understands the grave danger to our nation of our enormous indebtedness.  The most recent Joint Operating Environment (the assessment by Joint Forces Command that begins the military’s planning cycle) identified our national debt as the central threat to our military dominance, because unless the debt is reduced, interest paid on it will crowd out discretionary spending for defense.  By 2018, our government will be spending more on debt service than on national defense.

And the DOD budget is not as lean or efficient as its defenders would have us believe.  Secretary Gates has pulled off one of the great slights of hand of our time by complaining loudly about defense cuts while not producing any. Just after the 2008 presidential election, Secretary Gates published a National Defense Strategy endorsing the current program and allowed the Services to publish cost unconstrained spending programs, ensuring that any budget proposed by the new Administration would be considered a cut.  DOD’s FY 2010 budget actually encompassed a 7.5% increase in defense spending amidst Secretary Gates talking as though he had taken a meat axe to the program.  His proposal to cut $100 billion across five years merely shifts spending within DOD’s topline. It produces no savings.  In fact, his FYDP (DOD’s 5 year budget outlook) is built on an annual 2% real increase in spending.

But in recent days Secretary Gates has hurt his own case by overstating the effect relatively minor cuts to defense will have.  Gates described the $100 billion cut across five years recommended by the Simpson-Bowles debt reduction commission as “catastrophic.”  It is difficult to see how a cut of less than 3% in annual spending would actually be catastrophic. 

Gates dismisses their recommended cuts as “math, not strategy.”  And he’s right that outsiders should not cherry pick programs to cut, but instead give DOD a topline figure and allow it to develop a comprehensive force structure.  But strategy is amenable to risk and choices, whereas arithmetic is unyielding.  We have a crippling problem of debt that we must solve; if cuts to defense spending are necessary to gain political acceptance for other, larger cuts to federal spending, we are well-positioned to absorb that near-term risk.

The Pentagon and defense industry ought to be very careful about wrapping themselves in the flag and claiming any cut is heresy, especially since our military – and particularly the ground forces – have been upgrading equipment as it has been replaced across the past decade.  We are nowhere near a hollow force, and nowhere near catastrophe if modest cuts are made. 

Where DOD’s budget does contain a potential catastrophe is in the growth of medical and retirement benefits.  The DOD budget contains in microcosm the same rise in costs for health care and retirement that dominate federal spending.  As Todd Harrison points out, “since FY 2000, the total military personnel and healthcare cost per active-duty troop has risen 73 percent in real terms.”  Unless changes are made to military entitlements, they will crowd out spending for weapons, training, and even personnel.  The military services have long been willing to raise co-pays for military medical care; it is Congress that has refused.  While Congress’ advocacy for Servicemembers and their families is admirable, it is misplaced in this instance.  It would be a reasonable place to start looking for savings.