Thomas G. Mahnken is a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Between 2006 and 2009, he served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy planning. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategy and planning.
The United States needs to get its fiscal house in order. The long-term health of the American economy, and the long-term wellbeing of Americans, demands it. What is less clear is the extent to which cuts in defense spending should be part of any package to do so. Too often, the question has been posed in economic terms: how much we can “afford” to spend on defense? The question should more properly be formulated in terms of U.S. national security: how much should the United States spend in order to protect the United States and its citizens from the challenges of today and tomorrow?
The answer to this question came in late July, when the congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel delivered its report to Congress. The 20-member panel, chaired by former Clinton administration Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Bush administration National Security Advisor Steve Hadley, included former senior officials from Democratic and Republican administrations as well as retired senior officers. I served on its staff. The group argued forcefully that if the United States is to continue play the international role it has for more than half a century, then we may need to do more, not less, when it comes to national defense.
The panel found "a significant and growing gap between the ‘force structure' of the military -- its size and its inventory of equipment -- and the missions it will be called on to perform in the future." The panel's members were particularly concerned that the force structure outlined in the Obama Administration’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review "may not be sufficient to assure others that the United States can meet its treaty commitments in the face of China's increased military capabilities." The report calls for an increase in U.S. force structure in the Pacific to counter Chinese military modernization, noting, "A robust US force structure, largely rooted in maritime strategy but including other necessary capabilities, will be essential."
It is powerful statement that a group of 20 senior officials who have served Democratic and Republican presidents agreed that "the [U.S.] force structure needs to be increased in a number of areas, including the need to counter anti-access challenges; strengthen homeland defense, including cyber threats; and conduct post-conflict stabilization missions. It must also be modernized." They called for an increase in the size of the U.S. Navy, the acquisition of a next-generation bomber, and new long-range strike systems. They also acknowledge that although the Defense Department must do everything it can to achieve cost savings on acquisition and overhead, "substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force. Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not re-capitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater."
The panel did point to areas of potential cost savings, however. For example, it tackled the sensitive issue of the Defense Department's rising personnel costs, noting that "a failure to address the increasing costs of the all-volunteer force will likely result in a reduction in the force structure, a reduction in benefits or a compromised all-volunteer force." It also laid out ways to streamline and cut the cost of acquiring new weapon systems. Both should be pursued vigorously.
Americans should welcome an honest debate over defense spending. But to be honest, such a debate should revolve around the role the United States should play in the world and the value of maintaining it.
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